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Abstract
We expand the current understanding of ecological resilience
to include the nested hierarchy of cognitive submodules that
particularly, if not uniquely, delineates human ecosystems.
These modules, ranging from the immune system to the lo-
cal social network, are embedded in a cultural milieu which,
to take the perspective of the evolutionary anthropologist
Robert Boyd, “is as much a part of human biology as the
enamel on our teeth”. We begin by extending recent treat-
ment of cognitive process, and of embedding culture itself, as
associated with characteristic information sources, to a cer-
tain class of ecosystems through a generalization of coarse-
graining. In the spirit of the Large Deviations Program, we
then import renormalization formalism via the Asymptotic
Equipartition Theorem of information theory to obtain punc-
tuated response to parameters of increasing habitat degrada-
tion. A Legendre transform of an appropriate joint informa-
tion permits analysis away from critical points, and gener-
ates the expected resilient quasi-stability in a highly natural
manner. We interweave the discussion with applications to
the public health impacts of the massive deurbanization and
deindustrialization presently afflicting the United States.
Key words: Asthma, cognition, deindustrialization, deur-
banization, diabetes, ecosystem, emerging infection, informa-
tion theory, obesity, resilience, social eutrophication, tuber-
culosis.
Introduction
We are compelled to begin with an extended and some-
what disturbing discussion of context: public health is under
siege in the USA. Nearly a quarter-century into the AIDS
pandemic, and antiretroviral therapies to the contrary, a re-
lentless toll of about 40,000 new human immunosuppressive
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virus (HIV) infections continues annually (Rosenberg and
Biggar, 1998). In addition, HIV has become resurgent among
groups in which it had previously been contained (Wolitski
et al., 2001). Asthma has been rising for decades, particu-
larly within urban minority neighborhoods (e.g. Carr et al.,
1992; Wright et al., 1999). Tuberculosis became resurgent
after 1978 in New York City, the conurbation which most
dominates the nation’s urban hierarchy, a fact having dire
implications for containment of the next wave of emerging in-
fections (e.g. D. Wallace, 1994, 2001; Wallace and Wallace,
1997; Wallace et al., 1995; 1999). Obesity, already described
as ‘epidemic’, has been increasing across all population sub-
groups for twenty years, and shows no signs of abatement
(e.g. Flegal et al., 2002). ‘Health disparities’ between af-
fluent majority and minority populations persist or widen in
spite of massive health care expenditures (e.g. Barnett et al.,
2001; Casper et al., 2000). Redirection of scarce resources
into ‘bioterrorist’ activities, according to informed opinion,
threatens to further damage the nation’s already frail public
health enterprise.
Three case histories across this increasingly bleak landscape
will be the focus of our analysis: New York’s tuberculosis out-
break, and the national obesity and asthma ‘epidemics’, as in-
dexed by the annual diabetes death rate across all populations
and the asthma death rate among African-Americans.
With regard to New York City, as has been described at
greater length elsewhere (e.g. R. Wallace and D. Wallace,
1997; D. Wallace and R. Wallace, 1998; Duryea, 1978), cut-
backs in essential municipal services during the 1970’s, part
of an extra-constitutional ‘planned shrinkage’ program ap-
parently aimed at both dispersing minority voting blocks and
clearing land for commercial purposes, initiated a very large
and destructive outbreak of contagious building fire and hous-
ing abandonment in high population density, poverty-stricken
minority neighborhoods. While the ‘South Bronx’ became
synonymous with the ensuing disaster, large parts of Central
Harlem in Manhattan, and a vast band across the minority
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sections of Northern Brooklyn, were badly affected as well.
By 1980 some 600,000 people were living in devastated zones
of the city (McCord and Freeman, 1990), and about 1.2 mil-
lion non-Hispanic whites had fled the city for the suburbs.
After 1978, in the face of what amounted to wartime condi-
tions, tuberculosis cases began to rise in New York City, by
1985 the disease was clearly resurgent, and by 1990 the city’s
outbreak had begun to affect outlying suburban populations
(e.g. Wallace et al., 1995, 1997).
By 1980, adult male life expectancy in Central Harlem had
declined to less than that of adult males in Bangladesh (Mc-
Cord and Freeman, 1990).
Figure 1 displays, for the Bronx section of New York City,
the change in percent of occupied housing units between 1970
and 1980. The data are shown by ‘Health Area’, standard
aggregates of US Census Tracts by which morbidity and mor-
tality statistics are reported in the city. A huge chunk of
the South-Central section lost as much as 81 percent of its
occupied housing in a short period.
The Bronx, with 1.4 million people in 1970, is one of the
largest urban centers in the industrialized world. Such peace-
time devastation is unprecedented.
Figure 2 is an annual composite index of building fire and
seriousness in New York City for the period 1959-1990, con-
structed by principal component analysis of numbers of struc-
tural fires, ‘serious’ fires requiring five or more units for ex-
tinguishment, and ‘extra alarm assignments’ beyond the first
responding set of units. The index has been shifted so that
zero fires gives a zero value. This is an environmental index of
the contagious urban decay which produced figure 1 (Wallace
and Wallace, 1998).
Figure 3 plots the number of reported tuberculosis cases
in New York City against the integral of figure 2 from 1959.
The argument is that, once a community is destroyed by con-
tagious urban decay, the social, economic, and political capi-
tal contained in it are permanently dispersed, at least on the
time scale of this analysis.
Two distinctly different systems are evident on this graph:
a declining relation from 1959 through 1978, and a sharply
rising one thereafter.
To anticipate the argument slightly, this sudden switch rep-
resents a kind of phase transition between two domains of re-
lation in the tuberculosis ecosystem, with accumulated com-
munity damage constituting the driving parameter of a phase
change having considerable hysteresis.
Figure 4 shows the counties of the Northeastern US which
lost more than 1000 manufacturing jobs between 1972 and
1987, i.e. the deindustrialized ‘rustbelt’ which Ullmann
(1988), Melman (1971) and others claim is a consequence of
the massive diversion of scientific and engineering resources
from civilian to military enterprise during the Cold War.
They argue that a healthy US manufacturing economy re-
quired at least a 3 percent annual improvement in produc-
tivity to maintain itself against foreign competition, a rate of
growth fueled by our considerable technical resources through
about 1965. Thereafter, increasing consumption of scientific
and engineering personnel by the military and aerospace en-
terprises of the Cold War, and the consequent shift in tech-
nological emphasis away from the needs of the civilian econ-
omy, made this rate of improvement impossible, and rapid US
deindustrialization ensued. Wallace et al. (1999) examine the
consequences of this collapse for the US AIDS epidemic.
Figure 4, like figure 1, represents the permanent disper-
sal of social, economic, and political capital within the worst
affected counties, particularly as deindustrialization appar-
ently contributed to patterns of deurbanization analogous to,
if less acute than, that of figure 1 in many US cities, e.g.
Pittsburgh, Dayton, Cleveland, Toledo, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Gary, Akron, St. Louis, parts of Chicago, and so on.
Pappas, (1989) describes the general circumstances:
“By 1982 mass unemployment had reemerged as
a major social issue [in the USA]. Unemployment
rose to its highest level since before World War II,
and an estimated 12 million people were out of work
– 10.8 percent of the labor force in the nation. It
was not, however, a really new phenomenon. After
1968 a pattern was established in which each reces-
sion was followed by higher levels of unemployment
during recovery. During the depth of the 1975 reces-
sion, national unemployment rose to 9.2 percent. In
1983, when a recovery was proclaimed, unemploy-
ment remained at 9.5 percent annually.
Certain sectors of the work force have been more
heavily affected than others. There was a 16.9 per-
cent jobless rate among blue-collar workers in April,
1982... Unemployment and underemployment have
become major problems for the working class. While
monthly unemployment figures rise and fall, these
underlying problems have persisted over a long pe-
riod. Mild recoveries merely distract out attention
from them.”
Massey (1990) explores the particularly acute effect of this
phenomenon on minorities:
“The decline of manufacturing, the suburbaniza-
tion of blue-collar employment, and the rise of the
service sector eliminated many well-paying jobs for
unskilled minorities and reduced the pool of mar-
riageable men, thereby undermining the strength
of the family, increasing the rate of poverty, and
isolating many inner-city residents from accessible,
middle-class occupations.”
Figure 5 shows the number of manufacturing jobs in the
US between 1980 and 2001, and figure 6 relates the integral
of manufacturing job loss after 1980 to the national diabetes
death rate per 100,000 between 1980 and 1998. Diabetes is, of
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course, a quintessential index of obesity, a problem linked to
a broad spectrum of chronic diseases, not only diabetes, but
including coronary heart disease, asthma, and certain forms
of cancer.
Two regions are evident in figure 6: a rough plateau be-
tween 1980 and 1988, followed by a sudden jump, and a sharp,
nearly linear, rise thereafter.
Figure 7 is an analogous graph for the annual asthma death
rate among African-Americans, plotted against the same jobs
deficit as figure 6 over the same period. The graph shows
a relentless ‘inverted-J’ transition from a relatively low to a
much higher endemic rate. The change has taken place in the
face of significant attempts at medical intervention, although
these have primarily been exhortations of the sick to ‘take
responsibility and manage your disease’, the processes of fig-
ures 1 and 4 notwithstanding. As the classic paper of Carr
et al. (1992) shows, most of the asthma increase has been
focused in minority urban communities which, we now know,
have particularly suffered the synergism of those processes.
We will argue here that the changes in these two chronic dis-
eases are an ecosystem phase transition recognizably similar
to that shown in figure 3, with the dispersal of social, eco-
nomic, and political capital indexed by the integral of annual
manufacturing job loss representing a kind of human habi-
tat desertification serving as the driving parameter of that
transition.
Ecosystem theorists recognize several different kinds of ‘re-
silience’ (e.g. Gunderson, 2000). The first, which they call
‘engineering resilience’, since it is particularly characteristic
of machines and man-machine interactions, involves the rate
at which a disturbed system returns to a presumed single, sta-
ble, equilibrium condition, following perturbation. From that
limited perspective, a resilient system is one which quickly
returns to its one stable state.
Not many biological phenomena – including those of hu-
man physiology and psychology – are actually resilient in this
simplistic sense.
Holling’s (1973) particular contribution was to recognize
that sudden transitions between different, at best quasi-
stable, domains of relation among ecosystem variates were
possible, i.e. that more than one ‘stable’ state was possible
for real ecosystems. Gunderson (2000) puts the matter as
follows:
“One key distinction between these two types of
resilience lies in assumptions regarding the existence
of multiple [quasi-]stable states. If it is assumed
that only one stable state exists or can be designed
to exist, then the only possible definition and mea-
sures for resilience are near equilibrium ones – such
as characteristic return time... The concept of eco-
logical resilience presumes the existence of multiple
stability domains and the tolerance of the system to
perturbations that facilitate transitions among sta-
ble states. Hence, ecological resilience refers to the
width or limit of a stability domain and is defined
by the magnitude of disturbance that a system can
absorb before it changes stable states... The pres-
ence of multiple [quasi-]stable states and transitions
among them [has] been [empirically] described in a
[large] range of ecological systems...”
Figure 3 shows two patterns of relation between accumu-
lated community damage and tuberculosis: monotonic de-
cline before 1978, and monotonic increase thereafter. Fig-
ure 6 shows stability of diabetes death rate with accumulated
deindustrialization between 1980 and 1988, and a jump and
linear rise thereafter, while figure 7 appears to be an inverted-
J transition to a raised endemic level.
An often presumed difference between ‘natural’ and human-
dominated ecosystems is, however, the particular role of both
individual and collective cognitive action: human ecosystems
are not simply reflex-driven, but can oppose reasoned, orga-
nized, responses to perturbation. A city facing a fire/housing
abandonment epidemic or a nation undergoing deindustrial-
ization are not simply ponds downhill from a leaking sewage
treatment plant which are subject to sudden eutrophication.
This paper presents a treatment of ecosystem resilience
which can, perhaps most crucially, be extended in a highly
natural manner to include a large class of explicitly cognitive
individual and collective phenomena, and indeed, to certain
cognitive submodules of human biology. The expanded anal-
ysis indeed recovers most of classical ecosystem resilience the-
ory, suggesting that the appropriate integrals of figures 2 and
5 do, in fact, parametize permanent, or at least highly per-
sistent, change in essential institutions and in the relations of
individuals and their health to those institutions, as indexed
by figures 3, 6, and 7.
Some comment on methodology is appropriate.
Jimenez-Montano (1989) describes the language metaphor
of theoretical biology, which we adopt here, as follows:
“In his epilogue to the fourth volume of pa-
pers issuing from the IUBS Symposia at Villa
Serbellion, inspired by papers of Pattee (1972)
and Thom (1972), among others, Waddington con-
cluded that...[in] situations which arise when there
is mutual interaction between the complexity-out-
of-simplicity (self-assembly), and simplicity-out-of-
complexity (self-organization) processes are...to be
discussed most profoundly at the present time with
the help of the analogy of language...
...Waddington [thus] suggested that it is a lan-
guage that may become a paradigm for [a Theory
of General Biology], but a language in which basic
sentences are programs, not statements...”
Jimenez-Montano goes on to summarize the elegant, if
rather limited, applications of formal language theory to
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molecular genetics, quoting Pattee (1972) to the effect that
a molecule becomes a message only in the context of larger
constraints which he has called a ‘language.’
Perhaps the essential defining constraint of any language
is that not all possible sequences of symbols are meaningful,
that is, systems of symbols must be arranged according to
grammar and syntax in the context of even higher levels of
structure, a matter to which we will repeatedly return.
The full implications of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem
(SMT), otherwise known as the Asymptotic Equipartition
Theorem, for Waddington’s program seem to have been
largely overlooked. A development based on that theorem is
useful, in particular, for examining the ways in which vastly
different ‘languages’ can interact to create complicated struc-
tures. The central problem then becomes the characterization
of ecosystems and the cognitive processes of human biology
and sociology as such (generalized) languages.
Our approach, based on robust application of the SMT,
has a flavor recognizably similar to that surrounding the role
of the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) in parametric statis-
tics. Regardless of the probability distribution of a particular
stochastic variate, the CLT ensures that long sums of inde-
pendent realizations of that variate will follow a Normal dis-
tribution. Analogous constraints exist on the behavior of the
information sources – both independent and interacting – that
we will infer characterize human and natural ecosystems, and
these are described by the SMT. Imposition of phase transi-
tion formalism from statistical physics onto the SMT, in the
spirit of the Large Deviations Program of applied probabil-
ity, permits concise and unified description of evolutionary
and cognitive ‘learning plateaus’ which, in the evolutionary
case, are interpreted as evolutionary punctuation (e.g. Wal-
lace, 2002a, b). This perspective provides a ‘natural’ means
of exploring punctuated processes in the effects of progres-
sive habitat disruption on individuals, institutions, and their
interactions.
Punctuated biological processes are found across temporal
scales. Evolutionary punctuation is a modern extension of
Darwinian evolutionary theory that accounts for the relative
stability of a species’ fossil record between the time it first ap-
pears and its extinction (e.g. Eldredge, 1985; Gould, 2002).
Species appear ’suddenly’ on a geologic time scale, persist rel-
atively unchanged for a fairly long time, and then disappear
sudden, again on a geologic time scale. Evolutionary pro-
cess is vastly speeded up in tumorigenesis, which nonetheless
seems amenable to similar analysis (e.g. Wallace et al., 2003).
Our model, as in the relation of the CLT to parametric sta-
tistical inference, is almost independent of the detailed struc-
ture of the interacting information sources inevitably associ-
ated with both cognitive and ecosystem processes, important
as such structure may be in other contexts. This finesses
some of the profound ambiguities associated with ‘dynamic
systems theory’ and ‘deterministic chaos’ treatments in which
the existence of ‘dynamic attractors’ depends on very specific
kinds of differential equation models akin to those used to de-
scribe test-tube population dynamics, chemical processes, or
physical systems of weights-on-springs. Cognitive and natu-
ral ecosystem phenomena are neither well-stirred Erlenmeyer
flasks of reacting agents, nor distorted, noisy, clocks, and the
application of ‘nonlinear dynamic systems theory’ to cogni-
tion or ecology will, in all likelihood, ultimately be found to
involve little more than hopeful metaphor. Indeed, as shown
below, much of nonlinear dynamics can be subsumed within
an information theory formalism through symbolic dynam-
ics ‘coarse-graining’ discretization techniques (e.g. Beck and
Schlogl, 1995).
While idiosyncratic approaches analogous to nonparametric
models in statistical theory may be required in some cases, the
relatively straightforward formalism we develop here, like its
cousin of parametric statistics, may well robustly capture the
essence of much relevant phenomena.
Modeling resilience
1. Coarse-graining a simple ecosystem modelWe be-
gin with a simplistic picture of an elementary predator/prey
ecosystem which, nonetheless, provides a useful pedagogical
starting point. Let X represent the appropriately scaled num-
ber of predators, Y the scaled number of prey, t the time, and
ω a parameter defining their interaction. The model assumes
that the ecologically dominant relation is an interaction be-
tween predator and prey, so that
dX/dt = ωY
dY/dt = −ωX
Thus the predator populations grows proportionately to the
prey population, and the prey declines proportionately to the
predator population.
After differentiating the first and using the second equation,
we obtain the differential equation
d2X/dt2 + ω2X = 0
having the solution
X(t) = sin(ωt);Y (t) = cos(ωt).
with
X(t)2 + Y (t)2 = sin2(ωt) + cos2(ωt) ≡ 1.
Thus in the two dimensional ‘phase space’ defined by X(t)
and Y (t), the system traces out an endless, circular trajectory
in time, representing the out-of-phase sinusoidal oscillations
of the predator and prey populations.
Divide the X − Y ‘phase space’ into two components – the
simplest ‘coarse graining’ – calling the halfplane to the left of
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the vertical Y -axis A and that to the right B. This system,
over units of the period 1/(2piω), traces out a stream of A’s
and B’s having a very precise ‘grammar’ and ‘syntax’, i.e.
ABABABAB...
Many other such ‘statements’ might be conceivable, e.g.
AAAAA..., BBBBB..., AAABAAAB..., ABAABAAAB...,
and so on, but, of the obviously infinite number of possi-
bilities, only one is actually observed, is ‘grammatical’, i.e.
ABABABAB....
More complex dynamical system models, incorporating dif-
fusional drift around deterministic solutions, or even very
elaborate systems of complicated stochastic differential equa-
tions, having various ‘domains of attraction’, i.e. different
sets of grammars, can be described by analogous ‘symbolic
dynamics’ (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1993, Ch. 3).
2. Ecosystems as information sources Rather than
taking symbolic dynamics as a simplification of ‘more exact’
analytic or stochastic approaches, it proves useful, as it were,
to throw out the Cheshire cat, but keep the cat’s smile, gen-
eralizing symbolic dynamics to a more comprehensive infor-
mation dynamics: Ecosystems may not have identifiable sets
of dynamic equations like noisy, nonlinear clocks, but, under
appropriate coarse-graining, they may still have recognizable
sets of grammar and syntax over the long-term.
Examples abound: the turn-of-the seasons in a temperate
climate, for many communities, looks remarkably the same
year after year: the ice melts, the migrating birds return, the
trees bud, the grass grows, plants and animals reproduce, high
summer arrives, the foliage turns, the birds leave, frost, snow,
the rivers freeze, and so on.
Suppose it is indeed possible to empirically characterize an
ecosystem at a given time t by observations of both habitat
parameters such as temperature and rainfall, and numbers of
various plant and animal species.
Traditionally, one can then calculate a cross-sectional
species diversity index at time t using an ‘information’ or
‘entropy’ metric of the form
H = −
M∑
j=1
(nj/N) log[(nj/N)],
N ≡
M∑
j=1
nj
(1)
where nj is the number of observed individuals of species j
andN is the total number of individuals of all species observed
(e.g. Pielou, 1977; Ricotta, 2003; Fath et al., 2003).
This is not the approach taken here. Quite the contrary, in
fact. Suppose it is possible to ‘coarse grain’ the ecosystem at
time t according to some appropriate partition of the ‘phase
space’ in which each division Aj represent a particular range
of numbers of each possible species in the ecosystem, along
with associated parameters such as temperature, rainfall, and
the like. What is of particular interest to our development is
not cross sectional structure, but rather longitudinal ‘paths’,
i.e. ecosystem ‘statements’ of the form
x(n) = A0, A1, ..., An
defined in terms of some ‘natural’ time unit of the system,
i.e. n corresponds to an again appropriate characteristic time
unit T , so that t = T, 2T, ..., nT .
To reiterate, unlike the traditional use of ‘information the-
ory’ in ecology, our interest is in the serial correlations along
paths, and not at all in the cross-sectional ‘entropy’ calculated
for of a single element of a path.
Let N(n) be the number of possible paths of length n which
are consistent with the underlying grammar and syntax of
the ‘appropriately coarsegrained’ ecosystem, e.g. spring leads
to summer, autumn, winter, back to spring, etc. but never
something of the form spring to autumn to summer to winter
in a temperate ecosystem.
The fundamental assumptions are that – for this chosen
coarse-graining – N(n), the number of possible grammatical
paths, is much smaller than the total number of paths possi-
ble, and that, in the limit of (relatively) large n,
H = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
(2)
both exists and is independent of path.
This is a critical foundation to, and limitation on, the mod-
eling strategy and its range of strict applicability, but is, in
a sense, fairly general since it is independent of the details of
the serial correlations along a path.
Again, these conditions are the essence of the parallel with
parametric statistics. Systems for which the assumptions are
not true will require special ‘nonparametric’ approaches. We
are inclined to believe, however, that, as for parametric sta-
tistical inference, the methodology will prove robust in that
many systems will ‘sufficiently’ fulfill the essential criteria.
This being said, some further comment does seem neces-
sary. Not all possible ecosystem coarse-grainings are likely
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to work, and different such divisions, even when appropriate,
might well lead to different ‘languages’ for the ecosystem of
interest. The example of Markov models is relevant. The
essential Markov assumption is that the probability of a tran-
sition from one state at time T to another at time T + ∆T
depends only on the state at T , and not at all on the history
by which that state was reached. If changes within the in-
terval of length ∆T are ‘plastic’, or ‘path dependent’, then
attempts to model the system as a Markov process within the
‘natural’ interval ∆T will fail, even though the model works
quite well for phenomena separated by ‘natural’ intervals.
Thus empirical identification of relevant coarse-grainings
for which our theory will work is clearly not trivial, and may,
in fact, constitute the scientific core of the matter.
This is not, however, a new difficulty in ecosystem theory.
Holling (1992), for example, explores the linkage of ecosystems
across scales, finding that mesoscale structures – what might
correspond to the neighborhood in a human community – are
‘ecological keystones’ in space, time, and population, which
drive process and pattern at both smaller and larger scales
and levels of organization. Levin (1989) writes
“...[T]here is no single correct scale of observa-
tion: the insights one achieves from any investiga-
tion are contingent on the choice of scales. Pattern is
neither a property of the system alone nor of the ob-
server, but of an interaction between them... pattern
exists at all levels and at all scales, and recognition of
this multiplicity of scales is fundamental to describ-
ing and understanding ecosystems... there can be no
‘correct’ level of aggregation... We must recognize
explicitly the multiplicity of scales within ecosys-
tems, and develop a perspective that looks across
scales and that builds on a multiplicity of models
rather than seeking the single ‘correct’ one.”
Given an appropriately chosen coarse-graining, whose se-
lection in many cases will be the difficult and central trick
of scientific art, suppose it possible to define joint and condi-
tional probabilities for different ecosystem paths, having the
form
P (A0, A1, ..., An), P (An|A0, ..., An−1)
(3)
such that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon un-
certainties can be defined on them. For paths of length two
these would be of the form
H(X1, X2) ≡ −
∑
j
∑
k
P (Aj , Ak) log[P (Aj , Ak)]
H(X1|X2) ≡ −
∑
j
∑
k
P (Aj , Ak) log[P (Aj |Ak)],
where the Xj represent the stochastic processes generating
the respective paths of interest.
The essential content of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem is
that, for a large class of systems characterized as ‘information
sources’, a kind of law-of-large numbers exists in the limit of
very long paths, so that
H[X] = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
=
lim
n→∞H(Xn|X0, ..., Xn−1) =
lim
n→∞
H(X0, X1, ..., Xn)
n+ 1
.
(4)
Taking the definitions of Shannon uncertainties as above,
and arguing backwards from the latter two equations (e.g.
Khinchine, 1957), it is indeed possible to recover the first, and
divide the set of all possible temporal paths of our ecosystem
into two subsets, one very small, containing the grammati-
cally correct, and hence highly probable paths, which we will
call ‘meaningful’, and a much larger set of vanishingly low
probability.
Basic material on information theory can be found in any
number of texts, e.g. Ash (1990), Khinchine (1957), Cover
and Thomas (1991).
The next task is to show how the cognitive processes which
so distinguish individual and collective human activity, can be
fitted into a similar context, i.e. characterized as information
sources.
3. Cognition as an information source Atlan and Co-
hen (1998) argue that the essence of cognition is comparison of
a perceived external signal with an internal, learned picture of
the world, and then, upon that comparison, the choice of one
response from a much larger repertoire of possible responses.
Following the approach of Wallace (2000, 2002a), it is pos-
sible to make a very general model of this process as an in-
formation source.
Cognitive pattern recognition-and-selected response, as
conceived here, proceeds by convoluting an incoming exter-
nal ‘sensory’ signal with an internal ‘ongoing activity’ – the
‘learned picture of the world’ – and, at some point, triggering
an appropriate action based on a decision that the pattern
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of sensory activity requires a response. It is not necessary to
specify how the pattern recognition system is ‘trained’, and
hence possible to adopt a weak model, regardless of learn-
ing paradigm, which can itself be more formally described by
the Rate Distortion Theorem. Fulfilling Atlan and Cohen’s
(1998) criterion of meaning-from-response, we define a lan-
guage’s contextual meaning entirely in terms of system out-
put.
The model, an extension of that presented in Wallace
(2000), is as follows.
A pattern of ‘sensory’ input, say an ordered sequence
y0, y1, ..., is mixed in a systematic way with internal ‘ongoing’
activity, the sequence w0, w1, ..., to create a path of compos-
ite signals x = a0, a1, ..., an, ..., where aj = f(yj , wj) for a
function f . An explicit example will be given below. This
path is then fed into a highly nonlinear ‘decision oscillator’
which generates an output h(x) that is an element of one of
two (presumably) disjoint sets B0 and B1. We take
B0 ≡ b0, ..., bk,
B1 ≡ bk+1, ..., bm.
Thus we permit a graded response, supposing that if
h(x) ∈ B0
the pattern is not recognized, and if
h(x) ∈ B1
the pattern is recognized and some action bj , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m
takes place.
The principal focus of interest is those composite paths x
which trigger pattern recognition-and-response exactly once.
That is, given a fixed initial state a0, such that h(a0) ∈ B0,
we examine all possible subsequent paths x beginning with
a0 and leading exactly once to the event h(x) ∈ B1. Thus
h(a0, ..., aj) ∈ B0 for all j < m, but h(a0, ..., am) ∈ B1.
For each positive integer n let N(n) be the number of
paths of length n which begin with some particular a0 having
h(a0) ∈ B0 and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B1. We shall
call such paths ‘meaningful’ and assume N(n) to be consid-
erably less than the number of all possible paths of length n
– pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare. We
further assume that the longitudinal finite limit
H ≡ lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
both exists and is independent of the path x. We will – not
surprisingly – call such a cognitive process ergodic.
Note that disjoint partition of ‘state space’ may be possible
according to sets of states which can be connected by ‘mean-
ingful’ paths, leading to a ‘natural’ coset algebra of the sys-
tem, a matter of some importance not pursued further here.
It is thus possible to define an ergodic information sourceX
associated with stochastic variates Xj having joint and con-
ditional probabilities P (a0, ..., an) and P (an|a0, ..., an−1) such
that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties
may be defined which satisfy the relations of equation 4 above.
This information source is taken as dual to the ergodic cog-
nitive process.
As stated, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and its variants
provide ‘laws of large numbers’ which permit definition of the
Shannon uncertainties in terms of cross-sectional sums of the
form
H = −
∑
Pk log[Pk],
where the Pk constitute a probability distribution.
It is important to recognize that different ‘languages’ will be
defined by different divisions of the total universe of possible
responses into various pairs of sets B0 and B1, or by requiring
more than one response in B1 along a path. Like the use of
different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem
(e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1991), however, it seems obvious
that the underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.
Nonetheless, dividing the full set of possible responses into
the sets B0 and B1 may itself require ‘higher order’ cognitive
decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the ne-
cessity of ‘choice’ within a more or less broad set of possible
‘languages of thought’. This would directly reflect the need
to ‘shift gears’ according to the different challenges faced by
the organism or organization. A critical problem then be-
comes the choice of a ‘normal’ zero-mode language among a
very large set of possible languages representing the ‘excited
states’ accessible to the system. This is a fundamental matter
which mirrors, for isolated cognitive systems, the resilience ar-
guments applicable to more conventional ecosystems, i.e. the
possibility of more than one ‘zero state’ to a cognitive system.
Identification of an ‘excited’ state as the zero mode becomes,
then, a kind of generalized autoimmune disorder which can
be triggered by linkage with external ‘ecological’ information
sources of structured psychosocial stress, a matter we explore
at length elsewhere (Wallace et al., 2003).
In sum, meaningful paths – creating an inherent grammar
and syntax – have been defined entirely in terms of system
response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose.
This formalism can be applied to the stochastic neuron in
a neural network: A series of inputs yji , i = 1, ...m from m
nearby neurons at time j to the neuron of interest is convo-
luted with ‘weights’ wji , i = 1, ...,m, using an inner product
aj = yj ·wj ≡
m∑
i=1
yjiw
j
i
(5)
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in the context of a ‘transfer function’ f(yj ·wj) such that the
probability of the neuron firing and having a discrete output
zj = 1 is P (zj = 1) = f(yj ·wj).
Thus the probability that the neuron does not fire at time
j is just 1 − P . In the usual terminology the m values yji
constitute the ‘sensory activity’ and the m weights wji the
‘ongoing activity’ at time j, with aj = yj ·wj and the path
x ≡ a0, a1, ..., an, .... A more elaborate example is given in
Wallace (2002a).
A little work leads to a standard neural network model
in which the network is trained by appropriately varying w
through least squares or other error minimization feedback.
This can be shown to replicate rate distortion arguments, as
we can use the error definition to define a distortion function
which measures the difference between the training pattern
y and the network output yˆ as a function, for example, of
the inverse number of training cycles, K. As we will discuss
in another context, ‘learning plateau’ behavior emerges natu-
rally as a phase transition in the mutual information I(Y, Yˆ )
driven by the parameter K.
This leads eventually to parametization of the information
source uncertainty of the dual information source to a cogni-
tive pattern recognition-and-response with respect to one or
more variates, writing, e.g. H[K], where K ≡ (K1, ...,Ks)
represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K
follow some path in time, i.e. trace out a generalized line
or surface K(t). We will, following the argument of Wal-
lace (2002b), assume that the probabilities defining H, for
the most part, closely track changes in K(t), so that along a
particular ‘piece’ of a path in parameter space the informa-
tion source remains as close to memoryless and ergodic as is
needed for the mathematics to work. Between pieces we will,
below, impose phase transition characterized by a renormal-
ization symmetry, in the sense of Wilson (1971). See Binney,
et al. (1986) and Wallace et al. (2003) for a more complete
discussion of the formal mathematics.
Such an information source can be termed ‘adiabatically
piecewise memoryless ergodic’ (APME). To reiterate, the er-
godic nature of the information sources is a generalization
of the ‘law of large numbers’ and implies that the long-time
averages we will need to calculate can, in fact, be closely ap-
proximated by averages across the probability spaces of those
sources. This is no small matter.
The reader may have noticed parallels with Fodor’s specu-
lations on the ‘language of thought’ (e.g. Fodor, 1975, 1981,
1987, 1990, 1994, 1998, 1999) in which he proposes a Chom-
skian ‘linguistically complete’ background ‘natural’ language
as the basis of mental function in humans. This work, in con-
trast, takes a ‘weak’ asymptotic approach which does not re-
quire linguistic completeness, but only that very long series of
outputs may be characterized as the product of a ‘dual’ infor-
mation source which is adiabatically, piecewise, memoryless
ergodic. This allows importation of phase transition and other
methods from statistical physics, done below, which provide
a natural approach to the interaction of cognitive submodules
or the incorporation of individual and collective cognitive phe-
nomena into a more general ecosystem perspective, as we do
here.
4. Some cognitive modules of human biology
It is possible to cast a broad spectrum of human biological,
psychological, and social phenomena in a cognitive context.
Immune function Atlan and Cohen (1998) have proposed
an information-theoretic cognitive model of immune func-
tion and process, a paradigm incorporating cognitive pattern
recognition-and-response behaviors analogous to those of the
central nervous system. This work follows in a very long tra-
dition of speculation on the cognitive properties of the im-
mune system (e.g. Tauber, 1998; Podolsky and Tauber, 1998;
Grossman, 1989, 1992, 1993a, b, 2000).
From the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the meaning of an anti-
gen can be reduced to the type of response the antigen gen-
erates. That is, the meaning of an antigen is functionally
defined by the response of the immune system. The mean-
ing of an antigen to the system is discernible in the type of
immune response produced, not merely whether or not the
antigen is perceived by the receptor repertoire. Because the
meaning is defined by the type of response there is indeed a
response repertoire and not only a receptor repertoire.
To account for immune interpretation Cohen (1992, 2000)
has reformulated the cognitive paradigm for the immune sys-
tem. The immune system can respond to a given antigen in
various ways, it has ‘options.’ Thus the particular response
we observe is the outcome of internal processes of weighing
and integrating information about the antigen.
In contrast to Burnet’s view of the immune response as a
simple reflex, it is seen to exercise cognition by the interpola-
tion of a level of information processing between the antigen
stimulus and the immune response. A cognitive immune sys-
tem organizes the information borne by the antigen stimulus
within a given context and creates a format suitable for in-
ternal processing; the antigen and its context are transcribed
internally into the ‘chemical language’ of the immune system.
The cognitive paradigm suggests a language metaphor to
describe immune communication by a string of chemical sig-
nals. This metaphor is apt because the human and immune
languages can be seen to manifest several similarities such as
syntax and abstraction. Syntax, for example, enhances both
linguistic and immune meaning.
Although individual words and even letters can have their
own meanings, an unconnected subject or an unconnected
predicate will tend to mean less than does the sentence gen-
erated by their connection.
The immune system creates a ‘language’ by linking two
ontogenetically different classes of molecules in a syntactical
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fashion. One class of molecules are the T and B cell recep-
tors for antigens. These molecules are not inherited, but are
somatically generated in each individual. The other class of
molecules responsible for internal information processing is
encoded in the individual’s germline.
Meaning, the chosen type of immune response, is the out-
come of the concrete connection between the antigen subject
and the germline predicate signals.
The transcription of the antigens into processed peptides
embedded in a context of germline ancillary signals consti-
tutes the functional ‘language’ of the immune system. De-
spite the logic of clonal selection, the immune system does
not respond to antigens as they are, but to abstractions of
antigens-in-context.
Tumor control The next cognitive submodule after the
immune system appears to be a tumor control mechanism
which may include ‘immune surveillance’, but clearly tran-
scends it. Nunney (1999) has explored cancer occurrence as
a function of animal size, suggesting that in larger animals,
whose lifespan grows as about the 4/10 power of their cell
count, prevention of cancer in rapidly proliferating tissues be-
comes more difficult in proportion to size. Cancer control
requires the development of additional mechanisms and sys-
tems to address tumorigenesis as body size increases – a syn-
ergistic effect of cell number and organism longevity. Nunney
concludes
“This pattern may represent a real barrier to the
evolution of large, long-lived animals and predicts
that those that do evolve ... have recruited addi-
tional controls [over those of smaller animals] to pre-
vent cancer.”
In particular, different tissues may have evolved markedly
different tumor control strategies. All of these, however, are
likely to be energetically expensive, permeated with different
complex signaling strategies, and subject to a multiplicity of
reactions to signals, including those related to psychosocial
stress. Forlenza and Baum (2000) explore the effects of stress
on the full spectrum of tumor control, ranging from DNA
damage and control, to apoptosis, immune surveillance, and
mutation rate. Elsewhere (R. Wallace et al., 2003) we argue
that this elaborate tumor control strategy, at least in large
animals, must be at least as cognitive as the immune system
itself, which is one of its components: some comparison must
be made with an internal picture of a ‘healthy’ cell, and a
choice made as to response: none, attempt DNA repair, trig-
ger programmed cell death, engage in full-blown immune at-
tack. This is, from the Atlan/Cohen perspective, the essence
of cognition.
The HPA axis The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis, the ‘flight-or-fight’ system, is clearly cognitive
in the Atlan/Cohen sense. Upon recognition of a new pertur-
bation in the surrounding environment, memory and brain
or emotional cognition evaluate and choose from several pos-
sible responses: no action needed, flight, fight, helplessness
(i.e. flight or fight needed, but not possible). Upon appro-
priate conditioning, the HPA axis is able to accelerate the
decision process, much as the immune system has a more effi-
cient response to second pathogenic challenge once the initial
infection has become encoded in immune memory. Certainly
‘hyperreactivity’ in the context of post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD) is a well known example. Chronic HPA axis
activation is deeply implicated in visceral obesity leading to
diabetes and heart disease (e.g. Bjorntorp, 2001).
Blood pressure regulation Rau and Elbert (2001) re-
view much of the literature on blood pressure regulation, par-
ticularly the interaction between baroreceptor activation and
central nervous function. We paraphrase something of their
analysis. The essential point, of course, is that unregulated
blood pressure would be quickly fatal in any animal with a
circulatory system, a matter as physiologically fundamental
as tumor control. Much work over the years has elucidated
some of the mechanisms involved: increase in arterial blood
pressure stimulates the arterial baroreceptors which in turn
elicit the baroreceptor reflex, causing a reduction in cardiac
output and in peripheral resistance, returning pressure to its
original level. The reflex, however, is not actually this sim-
ple: it may be inhibited through peripheral processes, for
example under conditions of high metabolic demand. In ad-
dition, higher brain structures modulate this reflex arc, for
instance when threat is detected and fight or flight responses
are being prepared. This suggests, then, that blood pressure
control cannot be a simple reflex, but is, rather, a broad and
actively cognitive modular system which compares a set of in-
coming signals with an internal reference configuration, and
then chooses an appropriate physiological level of blood pres-
sure from a large repertory of possible levels, i.e. a cognitive
process in the Atlan/Cohen sense. The baroreceptors and the
baroreceptor reflex are, from this perspective, only one set of
a complex array of components making up a larger and more
comprehensive cognitive blood pressure regulatory module.
Emotion Thayer and Lane (2000) summarize the case for
what can be described as a cognitive emotional process. Emo-
tions, in their view, are an integrative index of individual ad-
justment to changing environmental demands, an organismal
response to an environmental event that allows rapid mobi-
lization of multiple subsystems. Emotions are the moment-
to-moment output of a continuous sequence of behavior, orga-
nized around biologically important functions. These ‘lawful’
sequences have been termed ‘behavioral systems’ by Timber-
lake (1994).
Emotions are self-regulatory responses that allow the effi-
cient coordination of the organism for goal-directed behavior.
Specific emotions imply specific eliciting stimuli, specific ac-
tion tendencies including selective attention to relevant stim-
uli, and specific reinforcers. When the system works properly,
it allows for flexible adaptation of the organism to changing
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environmental demands, so that an emotional response repre-
sents a selection of an appropriate response and the inhibition
of other less appropriate responses from a more or less broad
behavioral repertoire of possible responses. Such ‘choice’ leads
directly to something closely analogous to the Atlan and Co-
hen language metaphor.
Damasio (1998) concludes that emotion is the most complex
expression of homeostatic regulatory systems. The results of
emotion serve the purpose of survival even in nonminded or-
ganisms, operating along dimensions of approach or aversion,
of appetition or withdrawal. Emotions protect the subject
organism by avoiding predators or scaring them away, or by
leading the organism to food and sex. Emotions often op-
erate as a basic mechanism for making decisions without the
labors of reason, that is, without resorting to deliberated con-
siderations of facts, options, outcomes, and rules of logic. In
humans learning can pair emotion with facts which describe
the premises of a situation, the option taken relative to solv-
ing the problems inherent in a situation, and perhaps most
importantly, the outcomes of choosing a certain option, both
immediately and in the future. The pairing of emotion and
fact remains in memory in such a way that when the facts are
considered in deliberate reasoning when a similar situation is
revisited, the paired emotion or some aspect of it can be re-
activated. The recall, according to Damasio, allows emotion
to exert its pairwise qualification effect, either as a conscious
signal or as nonconscious bias, or both, In both types of ac-
tion the emotions and the machinery underlying them play
an important regulatory role in the life of the organism. This
higher order role for emotion is still related to the needs of
survival, albeit less apparently.
Thayer and Friedman (2002) argue, from a dynamic sys-
tems perspective, that failure of what they term ‘inhibitory
processes’ which, among other things, direct emotional re-
sponses to environmental signals, is an important aspect of
psychological and other disorder. Sensitization and inhibi-
tion, they claim, ‘sculpt’ the behavior of an organism to meet
changing environmental demands. When these inhibitory pro-
cesses are dysfunctional – choice fails – pathology appears at
numerous levels of system function, from the cellular to the
cognitive.
Thayer and Lane (2000) also take a dynamic systems per-
spective on emotion and behavioral subsystems which, in the
service of goal-directed behavior and in the context of a be-
havioral system, they see organized into coordinated assem-
blages that can be described by a small number of control
parameters, like the factors of factor analysis, revealing the
latent structure among a set of questionnaire items thereby
reducing or mapping the higher dimensional item space into a
lower dimensional factor space. In their view, emotions may
represent preferred configurations in a larger ‘state-space’ of
a possible behavioral repertoire of the organism. From their
perspective, disorders of affect represent a condition in which
the individual is unable to select the appropriate response,
or to inhibit the inappropriate response, so that the response
selection mechanism is somehow corrupted.
Gilbert (2001) suggests that a canonical form of such ‘cor-
ruption’ is the excitation of modes that, in other circum-
stances, represent ‘normal’ evolutionary adaptations.
‘Rational thought’ Although the Cartesian dichotomy
between ‘rational thought’ and ‘emotion’ may be increasingly
suspect, nonetheless humans, like many other animals, do in-
deed conduct individual rational cognitive decision-making as
most of us would commonly understand it. Various forms of
dementia involve, among other things, degradation in that
ability.
Sociocultural network Humans are particularly noted
for a hypersociality which inevitably enmeshes us all in group
processes of decision, i.e. collective cognitive behavior within
a social network, tinged by an embedding shared culture. For
humans, culture is truly fundamental. Durham (1991) argues
that genes and culture are two distinct but interacting systems
of inheritance within human populations. Information of both
kinds has influence, actual or potential, over behaviors, which
creates a real and unambiguous symmetry between genes and
phenotypes on the one hand, and culture and phenotypes,
on the other. Genes and culture are best represented as two
parallel lines or tracks of hereditary influence on phenotypes.
Much of hominid evolution seems to focus on an interweav-
ing of genetic and cultural systems. Genes came to encode for
increasing hypersociality, learning, and language skills. The
most successful populations displayed increasingly complex
structures that better aided in buffering the local environ-
ment (e.g. Bonner, 1980).
Successful human populations seem to have a core of tool
usage, sophisticated language, oral tradition, mythology, mu-
sic, magic, medicine, and religion, and decision making skills
focused on relatively small family/extended family social net-
work groupings. More complex social structures are built
on the periphery of this basic object (e.g. Richerson and
Boyd, 1995). The human species’ very identity may rest on
its unique evolved capacities for social mediation and cul-
tural transmission. These are particularly expressed through
the cognitive decision making of small groups facing changing
patterns of threat and opportunity, processes in which we are
all embedded and all participate.
Next we explore how different information sources can
interact, in particular, how deterioration of an embedding
ecosystem can entrain the cognitive phenomena of human bi-
ology.
5. Interacting information sources: punctuated
crosstalk Suppose that a cognitive process at the individual
or group levels of organization can be represented by a se-
quence of ‘states’ in time, the ‘path’ x ≡ x0, x1, .... Similarly,
we assume an embedding ecosystem with which that process
interacts can also be represented by a path y ≡ y0, y1, ....
These paths are both very highly structured and, within
themselves, are serially correlated and can, in fact, be rep-
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resented by ‘information sources’ X and Y. We assume the
cognitive process and embedding ecosystem interact, so that
these sequences of states are not independent, but are jointly
serially correlated. We can, then, define a path of sequential
pairs as z ≡ (x0, y0), (x1, y1), ....
The essential content of the Joint Asymptotic Equiparti-
tion Theorem version of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem is
that the set of joint paths z can be partitioned into a rel-
atively small set of high probability which is termed jointly
typical, and a much larger set of vanishingly small probabil-
ity. Further, according to the JAEPT, the splitting criterion
between high and low probability sets of pairs is the mutual
information
I(X,Y ) = H(X)−H(X|Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )−H(X,Y )
(6)
where H(X),H(Y ),H(X|Y ) and H(X,Y ) are, respec-
tively, the Shannon uncertainties of X and Y , their condi-
tional uncertainty, and their joint uncertainty. Again, see
Cover and Thomas (1991) or Ash (1990) for mathematical de-
tails. As stated above, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and
its variants permit expression of the various uncertainties in
terms of cross sectional sums of terms of the form −Pk log[Pk]
where the Pk are appropriate direct or conditional probabili-
ties. Similar approaches to neural process have been recently
adopted by Dimitrov and Miller (2001).
The high probability pairs of paths are, in this formulation,
all equiprobable, and if N(n) is the number of jointly typical
pairs of length n, then, according to the Shannon-McMillan
Theorem and its ‘joint’ variants,
I(X,Y ) = lim
n→∞
log[N(n)]
n
.
(7)
Generalizing the earlier language-on-a-network models of
Wallace and Wallace (1998, 1999), suppose there is a ‘cou-
pling parameter’ P representing the degree of linkage between
the cognitive human subsystem of interest and the structured
‘language’ of the embedding ecosystem, and set K = 1/P ,
following the development of those earlier studies. Then we
have
I[K] = lim
n→∞
log[N(K,n)]
n
.
The essential ‘homology’ between information theory and
statistical mechanics lies in the similarity of this expression
with the infinite volume limit of the free energy density. If
Z(K) is the statistical mechanics partition function derived
from the system’s Hamiltonian, then the free energy density
is determined by the relation
F [K] = lim
V→∞
log[Z(K)]
V
.
(8)
F is the free energy density, V the system volume and K =
1/T , where T is the system temperature.
Various authors argue at some length (e.g. Wallace, 2003;
Rojdestvensky and Cottam, 2000; Feynman, 1996) that this
is indeed a systematic mathematical homology which, it can
be shown, permits importation of renormalization symme-
try into information theory. Imposition of invariance under
renormalization on the mutual information splitting criterion
I(X,Y ) implies the existence of phase transitions analogous to
learning plateaus or punctuated evolutionary equilibria in the
relations between cognitive mechanism and the embedding
ecosystem. An extensive mathematical treatment of these
ideas is presented elsewhere (e.g. Wallace, 2000, 2002a,b;
Wallace et al., 2003). Much of the uniqueness of the system
under study will be expressed in the ‘renormalization rela-
tions’ associated with that punctuation. See Wallace et al.
(2003) for fuller discussion.
Elaborate developments are possible. From a the more lim-
ited perspective of the Rate Distortion Theorem, a selective
corollary of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem, we can view the
onset of a punctuated interaction between the cognitive pro-
cess and embedding ecosystem as the literal writing of dis-
torted image of those systems upon each other, Lewontin’s
(2000) ‘interpenetration’:
Suppose that two (adiabatically, piecewise memoryless, er-
godic) information sourcesY andB begin to interact, to ‘talk’
to each other, i.e. to influence each other in some way so
that it is possible, for example, to look at the output of B –
strings b – and infer something about the behavior of Y from
it – strings y. We suppose it possible to define a retranslation
from the B-language into the Y-language through a determin-
istic code book, and call Yˆ the translated information source,
as mirrored by B.
Define some distortion measure comparing paths y to paths
yˆ, d(y, yˆ) (Cover and Thomas, 1991). We invoke the Rate Dis-
tortion Theorem’s mutual information I(Y, Yˆ ), which is the
splitting criterion between high and low probability pairs of
paths. Impose, now, a parametization by an inverse coupling
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strengthK, and a renormalization symmetry representing the
global structure of the system coupling.
Extending the analyses, triplets of sequences, Y1, Y2, Z, for
which one in particular, here Z, is the ‘embedding context’
affecting the other two, can also be divided by a splitting
criterion into two sets, having high and low probabilities re-
spectively. The probability of a particular triplet of sequences
is then determined by the conditional probabilities
P (Y1 = y1, Y2 = y2, Z = z) = Πnj=1p(y
1
j |zj)p(y2j |zj)p(zj).
(9)
That is, Y1 and Y2 are, in some measure, driven by their
interaction with Z.
For large n the number of triplet sequences in the high
probability set will be determined by the relation (Cover and
Thomas, 1992, p. 387)
N(n) ∝ exp[nI(Y1;Y2|Z)],
(10)
where splitting criterion is given by
I(Y1;Y2|Z) ≡
H(Z) +H(Y1|Z) +H(Y2|Z)−H(Y1, Y2, Z).
It is then possible to examine mixed cognitive/adaptive
phase transitions analogous to learning plateaus (Wallace,
2002b) in the splitting criterion I(Y1, Y2|Z). We reiter-
ate that these results are almost exactly parallel to the El-
dredge/Gould model of evolutionary punctuated equilibrium
(Eldredge, 1985; Gould, 2002).
The model is easily extended to any number of interacting
information sources, Y1, Y2, ..., Ys conditional on an external
context Z in terms of a splitting criterion defined by
I(Y1; ...;Ys|Z) = H(Z) +
s∑
j=1
H(Yj |Z)−H(Y1, ..., Ys, Z),
(11)
where the conditional Shannon uncertainties H(Yj |Z) are
determined by the appropriate direct and conditional proba-
bilities.
In general, then, it seems fruitful to characterize the mu-
tual interpenetration of cognitive biopsychosocial and non-
cognitive ecosystem structures of human community within
the context a single, unifying, formal perspective summarized
by a ‘larger’ information source, more precisely, invoking a
mutual information between cognitive and ecosystem infor-
mation sources.
The next step is to parametize the ‘richness’ of the interact-
ing ‘languages’ by the degree of habitat degradation result-
ing from, for example, contagious urban decay or progressive
deindustrialization, and examine likely patterns of dynamic
change, which we will find to be both highly punctuated and
constrained by significant irreversibility criteria: i.e. Humpty-
Dumpty effects.
6. Resilience quasi-thermodynamics Our analysis sug-
gests certain ‘natural’ ecosystems and more complex cognitive
human communities (as well as individuals within communi-
ties and subsystems within individuals) may be characterized
by ‘languages’ in a general sense, and has examined the way
in which such information sources can interact in a punctu-
ated manner to form composite entities. The next step is to
explore phenomena of ecological resilience, in Holling’s (1973)
sense, for such composites, which will now be described in a
simplified shorthand only as a single generalized source un-
certainty H.
The essential assumption is that, as deindustrialization,
deurbanization, or other processes of socioeconomic or politi-
cal degradation proceed, the possible number of ‘meaningful’
paths for the composite system of interest becomes reduced.
That is, the ‘language’ of the human ecosystem becomes less
rich as social, economic, and political capital are dispersed by
processes like those leading to figures 1 and 4.
Painful scenarios are not difficult to construct, but the de-
tailed case studies of Pappas (1989), Fullilove (2004) and our
own work (Wallace and Wallace, 1998) have already done a
better job.
Suppose, then, thatH can be parametized by some index of
human habitat degradationK, and supposeH[K] a monoton-
ically declining function of K. As Cover and Thomas (1991)
or Ash (1990) describe, a decline in source uncertainty can be
interpreted as a decline in underlying ‘communication chan-
nel capacity’, since H ≤ C, where C is that capacity. As
social, economic, and political capital are dispersed by deur-
banization or deindustrialization, the social channel erodes,
and that, in turn, inevitably erodes the richness of the asso-
ciated human ecosystem, both cognitive and other aspects:
possible choices narrow, possible outcomes constrict.
If H is the analog to free energy density in a physical sys-
tem, K is the analog of an inverse temperature, and the next
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‘natural’ step is to apply a Legendre transformation to exam-
ine the behavior of the system away from phase transition,
defining a rough analog to thermodynamics in a physical sys-
tem. We will use the resulting formalism to explore a com-
plicated, and sometimes irreversible, synergistic dynamic of
habitat deterioration and ecosystem regime change.
The Legendre transform of a well-behaved function
f(Z1, ..., Zw), denoted g, is
g = f −
w∑
j=1
Zj∂f/∂Zj = f −
w∑
j=1
ZjVj ,
Vj ≡ ∂f/∂Zj .
(12)
The relation is invertible everywhere provided df/dZ is
strictly monotonic. That is, if d2f/dZ2 > 0 for all points,
we can write
f = g −
w∑
k=1
Vk∂g/∂Vk.
The generalization when f is not well-behaved is via a varia-
tional principle (e.g. Beck and Schlogl, 1993) rather than this
tangent plane argument. We will suggest that, for structures
strongly dominated by social or other biological interaction,
the existence of points for which the monotonicity/convexity
condition fails, e.g. points of inflection for H, may, in analogy
to physical systems, imply the existence of systemic changes
similar to phase transitions.
Consider a system for which H monotonically declines with
increasing K, an index of habitat deterioration. We define
S, an entropy-analog which we term the ‘disorder’, as the
Legendre transform of the source uncertainty H:
S = H −KdH/dK ≡ H −KU
(13)
where U = dH/dK is like the ‘internal energy’ of a physical
system. Since
dS/dK = dH/dK − U −KdU/dK = −KdU/dK,
then dS/dU = −K and dU ∝ (1/K)dS. This is like the
classic thermodynamic relation dQ = TdS for a physical sys-
tem, if we take 1/K → T . Thus the disorder S is indeed a
generalized entropy, albeit a strange one.
Figure 8 shows a proposed smooth reverse S-shaped form
for ecosystem source uncertainty as a function of K, an index
of habitat degradation. As K increases, the capacity of the
ecosystem as a kind of communication channel declines, since
possible choice narrows, and the number of possibly gram-
matical paths declines.
Parametize H by K and now invoke an interaction of the
phase transition arguments from the sections above, in terms
of K. Thus there will be a critical value, K = K0, at
which the ecosystem undergoes sudden transformation into
a markedly different form of internal organization. See the
appendix of Wallace et al. (2003) for arguments regarding
the renormalization properties of such ‘biological’ phase tran-
sitions, as opposed to simple physical ones.
Of particular interest is in the dynamic behavior of the
system as it approaches that ecological phase transformation.
Figure 8 shows the disorder S = H − KdH/dK superim-
posed on H. Closed physical systems gravitate to positions at
which an entropy measure, like S, is a maximum. We propose
that (thermodynamically open) systems strongly dominated
by social interaction and cognitive process are different from
closed physical systems in that they will often act, insofar as
they can, to minimize the experience of disorder.
For a physical system this kind of behavior can be de-
scribed, to first order, by the Onsager relations which charac-
terize the relation between the rate of change in driving sys-
tem parameters K1, ...,Km and the gradient of the entropy-
measure in those parameters, i.e.
m∑
k=1
Rj,kdKk/dt = ∂S/∂Kj
dKj/dt =
m∑
k=1
Lj,k∂S/∂Kk
(14)
where the terms ∂S/∂K are the driving ‘thermodynamic
forces’. For physical systems the Lj,k are positive. For so-
cial and biological systems, in contrast, it appears that there
are generalized Onsager relations for which Lj,k may be neg-
ative. That is, biological or social systems may be repelled by
disorder (e.g. Wallace and Wallace, 1998, 1999).
Taking this perspective, a community with a low index of
habitat deterioration, K, will begin at the left hand side of
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figure 8. As K increases, it first raises the disorder S. Initial
response of the ecosystem might be to attempt to compensate,
and reorganize itself to lower the perceived disorder, driving
the system back to the left, perhaps as a kind of limited home-
ostasis providing the often-observed ecological quasi-stability
described by Gunderson (2000).
If, however, increases in K are driven by overwhelming ex-
trinsic factors of public policy or environmental change, then
disorder rises to a maximum. Near that maximum, to the left,
small increases in K can cause a large increase in disorder.
Just to the right of the maximum, however, small increases in
K can, paradoxically, cause large declines in the disorder S.
Note that the maximum of S represents a point of inflection
for H at which the monotonicity of dH/dK fails. That is,
H is not necessarily a convex function, in sharp contrast to
simple physical analogs.
At such a point we are led to suggest that a self-reinforcing
dynamic or system of dynamics may emerge under which the
larger community literally falls off the right hand side of the
graph from the maximum of S in figure 8, dynamically driven
to the critical point K0 at which a new domain of ecosys-
tem relationship becomes established. This change, at an
inflection point of H, we claim, represents a behavioral phase
transition analog.
Note that, according to the analysis, transit from the right
hand side of figure 8 to the left hand side, i.e. back to the orig-
inal ecological configuration or domain, also faces a barrier,
suggesting an origin for the quasi-stability of the deteriorated
ecology.
On the other hand, that barrier may be partly surmounted
from right to left, for example by policies of rebuilding dev-
astated minority communities or of reindustrialization, until,
at the peak of S, quite suddenly the ‘richer’ ecological regime
again ‘locks in’ to quasi-stability. Thus ecosystem transitions,
once they actually occur, are subject to a kind of homeostatic
regulation, in this model of ecological resilience.
Note that equation (11) is expressed in terms of the effect of
an embedding context – Z – on a set of interacting information
sources. This suggests that alteration of that context, i.e. ‘re-
silience’ transitions of the embedding ‘natural’ ecosystem, can
entrain many of the cognitive phenomena which particularly
characterize human life, both individually and in community,
to put the matter euphemistically indeed.
Discussion and conclusions
It is our contention that the many linked cognitive mod-
ules of human biology, psychology, and sociology, can become
entrained by the disruption of embedding human habitat, re-
sulting in establishment of a new quasi-stable condition pro-
ducing a broad spectrum of comorbid mental and physical
disorders acting at and across various levels of scale and of
organization. Indeed, considerable cormorbidity should be
the norm under such circumstances.
Thus this work extends ecosystem resilience theory to the
cognitive phenomena which so mark humans both individ-
ually and in community, and develops, in addition, a more
general tool for examining the effects of habitat disruption
on the cognitive physiological and psychological submodules
common across many living things. The analysis invokes an
elaborate mathematical model for this, and it is crucial to
make explicit the limitations of such an approach: as it is
said, “all models are wrong, but some models are useful”.
The mathematical ecologist E.C. Pielou (1977), following the
‘theoretical ecology’ fiasco of the early 1970’s, warns that
“...[Mathematical] models are easy to devise;
even though the assumptions of which they are con-
structed may be hard to justify, the magic phrase ‘let
us assume that...’ overrides objections temporarily.
One is then confronted with a much harder task:
How is such a model to be tested? The correspon-
dence between a model’s predictions and observed
events is sometimes gratifyingly close but this can-
not be taken to imply the model’s simplifying as-
sumptions are reasonable in the sense that neglected
complications are indeed negligible in their effects...
In my opinion the usefulness of models is great...
[however] it consists not in answering questions but
in raising them. Models can be used to inspire new
field investigations and these are the only source of
new knowledge as opposed to new speculation.”
In this spirit it is particularly appropriate to speculate fur-
ther on the relations between public health and public policy
in the homeland of the American Empire.
Figure 8 summarizes our extended perspective on ecosys-
tem resilience suggesting that progressive degradation in hu-
man habitat – the systematic dispersal of social, economic,
and political capital like the processes generating figures 1
and 4 – will, after a critical point, suddenly entrain the func-
tion of important cognitive physiological, psychological, and
psychosocial modules of human biology. This, in turn, cre-
ates, a punctuated, multifactorial, multilevel, multiscale, and
highly comorbid, health catastrophe, exemplified by figures 3,
6, and 7, which, in the manner of ecosystem resilience transi-
tions, then becomes a quasi-stable, highly persistent pattern.
It is not stretching matters to call such a transition ‘social
eutrophication’.
While the tuberculosis outbreak of figure 3 was beaten
back with a labor-intensive and expensive (about $ 40,000
per case) program of ‘directly observed therapy’ using highly
hepatotoxic drugs, the ecological niche opened by the pro-
cesses of figure 1 remains, and is likely to be filled by other
diseases, both infectious and chronic. Since New York City is
the strongly dominant peak of the US urban hierarchy, this
circumstance has very serious implications for the national
spread of such emerging infections as multiple-drug resistant
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(MDR) strains of HIV and tuberculosis, as well as other pos-
sible new pathogens. Recent mayoral policies of closing more
fire companies, the ‘immune cells’ against the contagious ur-
ban decay producing figure 1, do not bode well in this regard.
At the national scale the relentless increase of obesity and
its outfalls – figure 6 – appears consequent on a persisting
population-level threat from social eutrophication resulting,
at the individual level, in chronic HPA axis activation and
self-medication of the cortisol/leptin cycle through overeat-
ing (e.g. Bjorntorp, 2001). That pattern is, indeed, likely
to worsen. The asthma epidemic among African-American
communities indexed by figure 7 is unlikely to respond to
medically-focused interventions which seem deliberately to
ignore underlying fundamental socioeconomic and political
causes driving that epidemic.
Public policies triggered the social and physical desertifica-
tion of figures 1 and 4. Presumably, given the political will
and a very considerable reinvestment of resources in civilian
enterprise, reformist public policies can, after overcoming an
inherent hysteresis, restore the human ecosystem of the US
homeland to some measure of health. The alternative would
appear to be further decline, sharply punctuated by episodes
of comorbid social eutrophication entraining all sectors of the
population. The aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
which has increasingly affected even the former nomenklatura,
was not an aberration, rather, according to our model, it was
recognizably analogous to the events we have reviewed for the
USA.
Currently predominant neoliberal ideology in the USA,
however, seems to preclude intervention. The influential pe-
riodical The Economist (1978, p. 10), commenting on the
collapse of the South Bronx, put the matter as follows:
“The bleak truth is that this [destruction] is the
natural and inevitable consequence of a shrinking
city. The destruction, poverty and hopelessness that
cluster around the burnt-out wrecks is abhorrent.
That something should be done to stop it is the im-
mediate reaction. That something should be done
to speed it up is nearer the mark.”
Norton and Rees (1979), describing the collapse of the US
industrial base, express the usual view:
“...[T]echnological changes are behind... the
demise of the Manufacturing Belt. The causal links
postulated between structural and regional changes
are reminiscent of Schumpeter’s ‘process of creative
destruction’... ”
which they likewise see as inevitable, and indeed another
‘natural’ phenomenon, a position trenchantly dissected by
Roberts (1991).
With such a captain and such a crew, as Melville put it
in Moby Dick, even first class passengers on the American
Empire seem in for a rough Middle Passage.
In spite of our elaborate biopsychosocial modeling exer-
cise, a critically (or, less benignly, an ideologically) motivated
reader might, at this point, question the relations between
figures 2 and 3, or 5 and 6 and 7: are these just unrelated
phenomena which happened to increase simultaneously, pro-
ducing a spurious correlation? Is there really a causal re-
lationship between deurbanization, deindustrialization, and
public health decline? Administrative data exist at munici-
pal, regional, and national levels of organization which could
illuminate this question. Within New York, and probably
other cities as well, data on unemployment/manufacturing
employment, housing loss, and on both asthma and diabetes
deaths would permit detailed spatiotemporal analysis, prob-
ably best done in five-year condensations about the 1980,
1990, and 2000 Censuses. Our earlier work on metropoli-
tan regions (Wallace, Wallace, and Andrews, 1997) suggests
that these can differ markedly in causal mechanism as well
as in spatiotemporal structure and dynamic and their rela-
tions to disease – often depending on the degree of ‘hollowing
out’ of the city center – so that analysis of health, employ-
ment, and housing data at this level of organization would
provide much insight. Similarly, spatiotemporal analysis of
employment, deindustrialization, population shift, and health
statistics across some 3000 counties nationally would likely be
useful in further exploration of national patterns, particularly
lagged spatiotemporal correlations. It should prove possible
to link the analyses across levels of organization, given the
remarkable degree to which large cities dominate the national
urban hierarchy, and central cities the urban/suburban inter-
action.
We call for resources to be made available for a full-scale
empirical study of the long-term effects of deurbanization and
deindustrialization on public health in the USA.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Change in percent occupied housing units in the
Bronx section of New York City between 1970 and 1980. Con-
tagious urban decay triggered by a policy of ‘planned shrink-
age’ involving withdrawal of fire-related municipal services
created degrees of devastation in poor minority neighborhoods
of the city which are unprecedented for a modern industrial-
ized nation not at war.
Figure 2. Annual composite index of building fire and
seriousness in New York City, 1959-1990. It is constructed
by principal component analysis of number of building fires,
number of ‘serious’ fires requiring five or more units working,
and number of ‘extra alarm assignments’ beyond the first five
units which respond. The index has been shifted so that zero
fires gives a zero value, and is a measure of the fire and hous-
ing abandonment epidemic producing figure 1. This outbreak
began at the 1970 level of housing overcrowding, about 70,000
housing units having more than 1.51 persons per room. By
1990, progressive housing loss had produced about 140,000
such badly overcrowded units, rewinding the ecological ma-
chinery for another possible outbreak of contagious urban de-
cay. As of this writing – and in the aftermath of the 9/11
attack – the City has begun closing more fire companies.
Figure 3. Number of reported tuberculosis cases in New
York City, 1959-1990, as a function of the integral of com-
posite damage of figure 2. An integral is taken since, once
a community is destroyed by contagious urban decay, its so-
cial, political, and economic capital are effectively dispersed,
on the time scale of our analysis. Two ‘ecological domains’
are evident: decline before, and rise after, 1978. The out-
break was contained by instituting an expensive program of
‘directly observed therapy’, but the underlying urban ecosys-
tem appears grossly unstable.
Figure 4. Counties of the Northeastern US which lost
more than 1000 manufacturing jobs between 1972 and 1987.
This is the infamous ‘rust belt’ which, in its dispersal of social,
economic, and political capital, closely mirrors the devasta-
tion of figure 1.
Figure 5. Number of manufacturing jobs in the US be-
tween 1980 and 2001. Note the sudden decline after 1980,
whose effects are well described by Pappas (1989).
Figure 6. US national rate of diabetes deaths per 100,000
population as a function of the integrated loss of manufac-
turing jobs after 1980. Diabetes is a good index of popula-
tion obesity. As in figure 3, two ecological domains are evi-
dent: stability through 1987, followed by a sudden jump and
a roughly linear rise thereafter.
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Figure 7. African-American asthma deaths per million
as a function of the same integrated manufacturing job loss
as figure 6. The ecosystem transition is more spread out,
showing an ‘inverted-J’ pattern of transition to a higher level.
The health status of African-American communities may be a
highly sensitive index of human habitat disruption for reasons
of both concentrated poverty and the cumulative, persistent,
effects of historical patterns of abuse.
Figure 8. The quasi-thermodynamics of resilience. As K
increases, the ‘richness’ of the associated ecology, as measured
by the source uncertainty H, progressively declines. The ‘dis-
order’ variate S = H − KdH/dK repels social and biolog-
ical systems, in this model, providing a limited version of
homeostasis, until essential parameters of habitat integrity
are broached, and a new ecological regime becomes estab-
lished as a ‘phase transition’ at the critical value of K = K0.
Note that S presents a barrier both to eutrophication and to
recovery from it.
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